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Abstract
In the 1990s, in many countries, wages became a more convex function of education:
returns to college increased and returns to intermediate education declined. This paper
argues that an important cause of this convexi￿cation was a two-stage demand-supply
interaction: an increased demand for educated workers stimulated a supply response;
an increased supply of intermediate-educated workers further increased the demand for
college-educated workers, because these two types of labour are complementary. This
argument is supported by an empirical equilibrium model of savings and educational
choices for Mexico, where the degree of convexi￿cation was ampli￿ed by loosening
credit constraints.
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11 Introduction
In the 1990s in many countries the wage-education pro￿le convexi￿ed:1 returns to college
increased and returns to intermediate education decreased or remained substantially un-
changed.2 E⁄orts to explain the convexi￿cation have focused on the US and two main
explanations have been proposed: increasing returns to college in a model where returns to
schooling are heterogeneous (Deschenes 2002 and Lemieux 2006), and di⁄erent degrees of
complementarity between computer technology, skilled and unskilled labour in a "task-based
technical change" model (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2006).3
In the US wages by education convexi￿ed at a time of modest changes in the supply of
labour (Goldin and Katz 2007); consistently, both previously proposed explanations of the
US convexi￿cation have taken the supply of labour as exogenously given. On the contrary, in
several low and middle-income countries wages convexi￿ed while the supply of workers with
intermediate and higher education increased in response to a growing demand for educated
labour.
In this paper I relax the assumption of exogenous labour supply and I explain the con-
vexi￿cation within a framework where educational choices respond to changes in the returns
to schooling. The core argument is based on a two-way interaction between the demand
and the supply of workers with di⁄erent levels of education: an initial rise in the demand
for workers with intermediate and college education increased the returns to both these two
types of educated workers and gave incentives to invest in human capital. A reduction of
credit constraints allowed the supply of workers with intermediate education to rise, which
further increased the demand for college graduates since workers with intermediate and with
1Lemieux (2006, 2007) and Deschenes (2002) for the US; Lopez Boo (2008) for Argentina; Metha, Felipe,
Quising and Camingue (2007) for Thailand, Philippines and India; Liu (2006) for Vietnam; S￿derbom, Teal,
Wambugu and Kahyarara (2006) for Kenya and Tanzania; Bouillon, Legovini and Lustig (2005) for Mexico;
Blom, Holm-Nielsen and Verner (2001) for Brazil; Schady (2001) for the Philippines.
2Consistently with the convexi￿cation of the wage-education pro￿le, the distribution of wages has been
characterized by divergent trends in upper- and lower-tail inequality: the 90th-50th percentile ratio of hourly
wages increased, while the 50th-10th ratio declined or increased much less (e.g. Goos and Manning 2003 for
the UK; Goldin and Katz 2007, Autor, Katz and Kearney 2006, Anderson, Tang and Wood 2006 and Wood
2002 for the US; Binelli and Attanasio 2010 for Mexico).
3The convexifcation of the wage-education pro￿le has also been studied in the context of the long run
theory of equilibrium wage functions deriving the theoretical prediction of a convex relationship between the
skill-intensity of an occupation and its marginal rate of return Mookherjee and Ray (2010).
2college education are complementary in production. As a result, returns to college increased
and returns to intermediate education declined.
The argument is investigated in the context of Mexico, a middle-income country where
the convexi￿cation was very pronounced: between 1987 and 2002 the wage gap between
workers with higher (college or more) and intermediate education increased by 73%, and
the wage gap between workers with intermediate and basic compulsory education declined
by 15%. This convexi￿cation was driven by a substantial reduction of the level of wages of
workers with intermediate education who faced a wage decrease of 5%. In the same years,
the demand for educated workers increased by 1.35% per year, while the supply of workers
with intermediate and with higher education increased, respectively, by 15% and 7%.
These supply changes could have caused the convexi￿cation by altering the composition
of workers, or by changing the prices of education because of the equilibrium e⁄ects of
changes in the supply of labour on wages. In order to disentangle the composition and price
e⁄ects on wages, I develop a model in which the supply of workers with basic, intermediate
and higher education reacts endogenously to changes in labour demand and market wages
depend on education prices, individuals￿age and ability. The setting is an incomplete market,
dynamic model of savings and educational choices where the interest rate is taken as given
and the production function allows for di⁄erent elasticities of substitution between workers
with basic, intermediate and higher education. Savings and education choices are made by
altruistic parents that face credit constraints.
I estimate the wage equations, the production function, and the distribution of wealth
and education, and I calibrate the rest of parameters. I ￿nd substitution elasticities between
aggregate human capitals that are consistent with the complementarity between intermediate
and higher education. I then use model￿ s simulations to study the determinants of the
convex wage shift by comparing the steady state wages that the model predicts in a baseline
scenario that matches the Mexican economy in 1987 and in di⁄erent counterfactual scenarios
characterized by an increased demand for skilled labour.
The simulations show that the convexi￿cation was driven by changes in the prices of
education due to a two-way interaction between changes in the demand and in the supply
of labour: a relaxation of the credit constraints allowed the supply of labour to respond to
3the increased demand for educated workers, which, because of the complementarity between
workers with intermediate and with higher education, further increased the relative demand
of workers with higher education and therefore their relative return while it further decreased
the relative return of workers with intermediate education. This mechanism emerges against
a number of alternative explanations including di⁄erent ways of modelling the increased
demand for labour.
The results con￿rm previous ￿ndings by Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) and Lee
and Wolpin (2006) that simultaneous movements in the demand and in the supply of workers
with di⁄erent levels of education are important determinants of changes in relative returns.
Importantly, and di⁄erently from both these previous papers, I jointly model education
and saving choices under credit constraints, which I ￿nd to be the main factor a⁄ecting
investment in education and via this returns to schooling.4
2 Wage convexi￿cation in Mexico
For the analysis of wages I use micro data from the Mexican Employment Survey (Encuesta
Nacional de Empleo Urbano or ENEU) from 1987 to 2002. The ENEU is the only Mexican
household survey continuously available since the late 1980s that collects detailed labour
market information and a large array of socioeconomic characteristics; the survey covers
only urban areas and collects information on both formal and informal workers that in the
1990s accounted for around half of the Mexican labour force (Maloney 2004; and Bosch and
Maloney 2006; Binelli and Attanasio 2010). As such, it has been widely used for studies of
the Mexican labour market, including several studies on changes in the wage distribution
(e.g. Binelli and Attanasio 2010, Bosch and Manacorda 2010, and Verhoogen 2008).
The sample selection criteria follow Binelli and Attanasio (2010): I consider all adults
aged between 25 and 60 that are actively working as either salaried or self-employed workers
at the time of the interview in all municipalities included in the fourth quarter of each
survey year between 1987 and 2002. I adjust wage data for in￿ ation by using the Mexican
4Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2007) also develop an equilibrium model of savings and educational
choices with credit constraints. Their model has a much richer structure than the one developed here.
4national CPI of June 2002, and I compute log hourly real wages for three education groups:
"basic education", which includes all workers with uncompleted intermediate education,
"intermediate education", which includes all workers with completed intermediate education
and up to uncompleted college, and "higher education", which includes all workers with
completed college or more. Appendix A1 provides a brief description of the ENEU, all
details on the sample selection criteria and on how I compute individual wages. Appendix
A2 provides details on the Mexican education system and on the construction of the three
education groups.
Figure 1: Convexi￿cation of the Mexican wage-education pro￿le. Source: ENEU data in
1987 and in 2002.
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Figure 1 and Table 1 present average log hourly real wages for each of the three edu-
cation groups. Between 1987 and 2002 the education-wage pro￿le convexi￿ed: the college-
intermediate log wage gap increased by 73% and the intermediate-basic log wage gap de-
creased by 15%. The absolute level of wages also changed di⁄erentially: it increased at
higher education and decreased at intermediate and at basic education. The most substan-
tial loss was at the intermediate level where log hourly real wages fell by 5%.5 A direct test
of this convexi￿cation can be performed by estimating a standard Mincer wage equation that
5Both the di⁄erence between mean wages by education in 1987 and 2002 and the changes in the wage
di⁄erentials are statistically signi￿cant.
5in addition to years of schooling, age and age squared includes a quadratic term of years
of schooling. By estimating this equation separately for 1987 and for 2002 I ￿nd that the
quadratic term of years of education is positive and highly statistically signi￿cant in both
years, and that it is higher in magnitude in 2002 with respect to 1987, which con￿rms that
the curvature of the returns to education functions has increased, and the returns have be-
came more convex. These di⁄erential wage changes by education are consistent with changes
by percentile of the wage distribution: unreported data, all available upon request, show that
the 90th-10th ratio of hourly real wages increased by around 19% and the 50th-10th ratio
decreased by around 8%.
% change ENEU data 1987-2002
Log wage level Log wage di⁄erential
Basic ￿4%
Intermediate ￿5% Higher-Intermediate 73%
Higher 3% Intermediate-Basic ￿15%
Table 1: Growth of log hourly real wages by level of education and of log relative wages
between 1987 and 2002 in Mexico.
The sampling scheme of the ENEU survey has changed over time with a number of
smaller municipalities having progressively entered the sample. One may worry that changes
in the composition of the ENEU sample could a⁄ect the results. An alternative to using all
municipalities included in each survey year is to restrict the sample to the 96 municipalities
that have been consistently surveyed in each year between 1987 and 2002. However, wages
by education are not signi￿cantly a⁄ected by this restriction and the wage convexi￿cation
remains evident: wages of higher relative to intermediate education increased by 83%, wages
of intermediate relative to basic education decreased by 27%, and wages of workers with
intermediate education decreased by 3%. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, I use the
sample that includes all municipalities in each survey year. Results using the restricted
sample are very similar and are available from the author upon request.
A vast empirical literature has documented two distinct episodes of changes in Mexican
wage inequality: a period of rising wage inequality from the end of the 1980s to the mid
1990s and a period of stable or even decreasing inequality in the second half of the 1990s
(e.g. Binelli and Attanasio 2010, and Bosch and Manacorda 2010). Consistently with the
6previous literature, the data show that the wage di⁄erential between workers with intermedi-
ate and with basic education increased until 1994 and decreased sharply from 1997. On the
contrary, the wage di⁄erential between workers with higher and with intermediate education
increased steadily between 1987 and 1996 and it then only decreased slightly by less than
1%.6Therefore, overall, between 1987 and 2002, relative wages to higher education increased
while relative wages to intermediate education declined. It is this wage pattern that this
paper is set to explain.
These changes in relative wages took place over a period of sixteen years that were char-
acterized by a signi￿cant increase in the supply of workers with intermediate and with higher
education. Between 1987 and 2002 the proportion of the adult working population aged be-
tween 25 and 60 with intermediate education smoothly increased from around 30% to 45%,
and the proportion of the adult working population with higher education increased from
around 10% to 17%. These supply changes are consistent with the ￿ndings of Behrman, Bird-
sall and Szekely (2007) and Gasparini, Galiani, Guillermo and Acosta (2011) that document
a substantial increase in the stock of educated labour in sixteen Latin American countries
where wages convexi￿ed.
The entrance of the new cohorts of educated workers could have induced the wages to
convexify by changing the composition of workers by level of education, as well as by changing
the equilibrium prices of education due to the interplay between the demand and the supply
of educated labour. Several previous analysis have studied the role of the demand and the
supply of labour to explain wage inequality within a standard Katz and Murphy (1992)
framework, which relies on the assumption that observed changes in wages and in labour
supply measure, respectively, changes in education prices and in human capital.7 Di⁄erently,
and following an extensive literature that started with the seminal contribution of Heckman,
Lochner and Taber (1998), I study labour demand and supply with an equilibrium model
that allows to disentangle the role of changes in prices and composition. In particular, I
develop a model in which the supply of workers reacts endogenously to changes in labour
demand and market wages depend on education prices, individuals￿age and ability.
6All results are available upon request.
7Three examples for Latin American are Raymundo, Esquivel, and Lustig (2012) and Montes Rojas (2006)
for Mexico, and Gasparini, Galiani, Guillermo and Acosta (2011) for sixteen Latin American countries.
7There is a vast empirical literature on wages and education in Mexico in the 1990s.
With respect to this literature, both the object of interest and the approach taken in this
paper are novel. The vast majority of the previous contributions have been focusing on the
increase in the premium to higher education rather than on the convexi￿cation, and all have
explained the rise in this premium with either changes in the supply or in the demand of skills
ignoring the equilibrium e⁄ects of changes in the supply of education on wages. The "supply-
side" literature focuses on ￿nancial constraints on educational choices and self-selection on
ability into higher education as two alternative explanations of the increase in the relative
wage of higher versus intermediate education. Testing these two alternative explanations,
Jacoby and Skou￿as (2002) ￿nd parental income being an important determinant of college
attendance, which is indirect evidence of credit constraints, and weak evidence of selection
bias. The "demand-side" literature focuses on the impact of trade liberalization and a
series of labor market reforms promoted in Mexico in the 1990s. These reforms changed
the structure of production and made the economy more open to foreign investment. The
reform e⁄ort culminated in 1994 when Mexico became a member of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and entered the North American Free
Trade Agreement with the US and Canada. In the same year Mexico was hit by a severe
￿nancial crisis, the "Peso crisis", which resulted into a massive devaluation of the national
domestic currency. The recovery from the crisis was rather quick and by the end of 1995
Mexico had reentered the international capital markets. The reform e⁄ort and the opening
to foreign investment resulted into an increase use of skilled labour and in the production of
skill-intensive goods. Most empirical studies have focused on the sharp increase in the skill
premium in the ￿rst half of the 1990s and have found evidence of a technological change that
increased the demand for skilled labour (Verhoogen 2008), and a positive impact of trade
opening on the skill premium (Hanson and Harrison 1999).
Rather than the increase in the skill premium, the object of interest of this paper is the
convexi￿cation, that is the contemporaneous increase in the relative wages of higher educated
and decrease in the relative wages of intermediate educated, which happened in the decade
of the 1990s rather than in either the ￿rst or in the second half of the decade. I will therefore
develop an equilibrium model that allows to quantify the e⁄ects of changes in the supply of
8education on wages between 1987 and 2002.
3 The model
Mexico is a country where education choices are still predominantly made by parents and
children￿ s work is often used to supplement household income (L￿pez Villavicencio 2005).
Therefore, I develop a model that has a dynastic structure where households consist of a
child and a parent that makes all savings and education choices.
3.1 Supply side: household decision problem
At each time t the economy consists of overlapping generations of parents and children that
live together for four periods, which reproduce the four main education cycles in Mexico:
pre-school and three periods necessary to complete basic, intermediate and higher education.8
Each individual lives for eight periods, four as a child and four as a parent. As a child
the individual lives with the parent that works full time and maximizes utility, which is a
function of joint household consumption. In the ￿rst period the child is in pre-school; in the
second period the child is sent to compulsory basic education; in the third and fourth period
the child can be sent either to school or to work. At the end of the fourth period the parent
retires and leaves a bequest of ￿nancial assets to the child who starts the adult life with the
level of education completed during childhood and an amount of assets given by parental
bequest.
Labour supply is perfectly inelastic and wages clear the labour markets. The wage of an
individual i with education level j and age a in period t is given by:
w
i
j;a;t = pj;t ￿ exp(e
i
j;a;t) j = 1;2;3 (1)
with
e
i
j;a;t = ￿
i + gj(age
i
t) + z
i
j;a;t (2)
8For simplicity the length of each period is assumed to be the same and equal to seven years in order to
match the average working life of adult Mexican workers of around thirty years.
9where j = 1;2;3 denotes the education level from basic up to higher education. Wages
depend on the price of education, pj;t, which is the equilibrium outcome of changes in the
demand and in the supply of labour, and on individual characteristics that are summarized
by individual labour e¢ ciency, ei
j;a;t, which is a function of ability, ￿i, an education-speci￿c
polynomial in age, gj(agei
t), and an i.i.d. uninsurable shock, zi
j;a;t assumed to be normally
distributed with mean zero and variance ￿2
zj;a;t. The g(:) polynomial re￿ ects the growth of
wages with experience, and z captures earnings￿volatility and uncertainty, which a⁄ected
wage changes in Mexico in the 1990s.9 Individuals￿ability endowment represents the per-
manent component of human capital. It is a measure of ability and all unobservable family
background factors that have a permanent impact on human capital. Consistently with the
high correlation between measured ability of parents and children in Mexico, each individual
inherits at birth the ability endowment of her parent and passes it over to her own child.10
Omitting for simplicity the t time index, parental maximization problem is given by:
Va(Xa) = max
fca;Iaga=a
a=a
E
(
a X
a=a
￿
a￿aU(ca) + ￿
3￿Va(Xa)
)
(3)
s:t: Aa+1 = Aa(1 + r) + wjP;a +
￿
(1￿Ia)wjC;a ￿ IaFjC
￿
￿ ca (4)
j
C
a+1 =
￿
jC
a + 1 if Ia = 1
jC
a if Ia = 0
￿
8 a = a ￿ 1;a (5)
Aa ￿ ￿Ba 8 a = a;:::;a ￿ 1 (6)
Aa ￿ 0 a = a (7)
where ca denotes joint household consumption at age a, and Xa is the vector of state
variables at age a, which includes the level of parental and child education, jPand jC
a , the
9The most signi￿cant event that a⁄ected wage volatility in Mexico was the Peso crisis of 1994, which has
been identi￿ed as an important determinant of changes in wage inequality (Verhoogen 2008).
10By using Raven test scores as a proxy for individual ability, data from the Mexican Family Life Survey
in 2002 show that the correlation between mother and father￿ s Raven scores and their children￿ s scores is
above 80%.
10amount of ￿nancial assets at age a, Aa, the vector of current and future education prices
forecasted from age a onwards, p(a), the ability endowment, ￿, and the idiosyncratic shock to
wages, za. ￿ is the degree of parental altruism, which is strictly greater than zero consistently
with the empirical evidence showing that Mexican parents care about their children￿ s utility
(Schluter and Wahba 2008). a (a) denotes the age of the parent at the start (end) of the
adult life, and Va(:) is the child￿ s lifetime utility once adult.
E denotes expectations that re￿ ect uncertainty due to the presence of the uninsurable
idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. The utility function is assumed to be strictly increasing
and concave in consumption, so that absolute risk aversion is decreasing in individual￿ s
wealth, the impact of risk on investment decisions being higher for poorer than for wealthier
households.11
Parents maximize utility under four main constraints. Equation (4) is a standard period
budget constraint with the term in square brackets switching on when child education be-
comes a choice variable: if the child is sent to work, the parent receives the child￿ s wage,
wjC;a; if the child is sent to school, the parent pays the ￿xed costs, FjC, for the jC schooling
level attended by the child. Equation (5) de￿nes the law of motion of child￿ s education.
Equation (6) is a borrowing restriction imposing a limit Ba on the amount of net indebted-
ness at age a. Equation (7) is a terminal condition that prevents parents from leaving debts
to their children.
The borrowing limit, Ba, can take any value between zero, which corresponds to the
maximum level of credit constraints of no possible borrowing, and an upper bound that is
given by the present discounted value of lifetime earnings at age a under the lowest possible
realization of individual labour e¢ ciency, that is under the lowest possible realization of the
idiosyncratic shock z. The upper bound represents the maximum amount that an individual
will be able to repay without violating the no-debt condition speci￿ed in equation (7).12
11The utility function is assumed to take a simple CRRA formulation:
U(c) =
(c)
1￿￿
1￿ ￿
where ￿ is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
12The empirical distribution of zj is de￿ned over a ￿nite support with a minimum value, zj, and a maximum
value, zj. The value of the upper bound arises naturally from the assumption that the utility function satis￿es
the Inada condition lim
c!0
U(c) = ￿1 and that parents have to repay all debts before retirement.
113.2 Demand side: aggregate production function
The representative ￿rm operates a constant returns to scale technology production function
over physical and human capital:
Yt = ZtK
￿
t HH
1￿￿
t (8)
where Yt denotes aggregate output, Kt is aggregate physical capital and HHt is aggre-
gate human capital.13 ￿ denotes the share of physical capital in production and Zt is the
technology factor that is normalized to one in all years. I assume that the economy is small
and open to the world ￿nancial markets. There is no labour migration while capital ￿ ows
in or out of the country so that the marginal product of physical capital equals the world
interest rate, r.
I specify HHt as a nested CES function of unskilled (Hu), and skilled (Hs) human capital:
HHt = [(1 ￿ ￿s;t)H
￿
u;t + ￿s;tH
￿
s;t]
1
￿ (9)
where Hu;t = H1;t, and Hs;t is a CES composite of H2;t and H3;t:
Hs;t = [(1 ￿ ￿3;t)H
￿
2;t + ￿3;tH
￿
3;t]
1
￿ (10)
The time-varying and education-speci￿c parameters ￿ and ￿ in equation (9) and (10)
denote the shares of the human capital factors in production and re￿ ect variations in the
productivity and in the demand of the di⁄erent inputs. The parameters ￿ and ￿ determine
the elasticity of substitution between human capital pairs. Using the de￿nition of the direct
elasticity of substitution, we obtain that ESu;s = ES1;2 = ES1;3 = 1
1￿￿, and ES2;3 = 1
1￿￿.14
13This speci￿cation of the production function assumes that there are no complementarities between
physical and human capital. This assumption is motivated by the near-constancy of the share of physical
capital in production estimated for Latin America in the 1990s (Bosworth, 1998, Harrison, 1996 and Ho⁄man,
1993).
14There are three ways of nesting three human capital inputs within a CES aggregate: g HH1 =
￿1(H3;￿2(H2;H1)); g HH2 = ￿2(H2;￿2(H3;H1)) and g HH3 = ￿3(H1;￿2(H2;H3)), where ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3
are CES aggregates. I have chosen the g HH3 nesting since the restrictions imposed by the g HH1 and g HH2
nestings contrast with the factor elasticities previously estimated for Latin America, which show that the
elasticity of substitution between higher and intermediate education di⁄ers from the elasticity of substitu-
12Labour income is measured in e¢ ciency units and the aggregate stock of human capital
j in year t, Hj;t, is given by the sum of the e¢ ciency weighted individual supply of education
level j, h
j
i;t:
Hj;t =
X
i
h
j
i;t j = 1;2;3 (11)
Under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets and pro￿t maximization by ￿rms,
the price of education level j in year t, pj;t, is given by the marginal product of the jth
aggregate human capital. By taking the ratios of the marginal products, I can derive the
expressions for the relative prices of education:
p2;t
p1;t
=
￿s;t
(1 ￿ ￿s;t)
(1 ￿ ￿3;t)
￿
H1;t
H2;t
￿1￿￿ (
(1 ￿ ￿3;t) + ￿3;t
￿
H3;t
H2;t
￿￿) ￿￿￿
￿
(12)
p3;t
p2;t
=
￿3;t
(1 ￿ ￿3;t)
￿
H3;t
H2;t
￿￿￿1
(13)
p3;t
p1;t
=
￿s;t
(1 ￿ ￿s;t)
￿3;t
￿
H1;t
H3;t
￿1￿￿ (
￿3;t + (1 ￿ ￿3;t)
￿
H2;t
H3;t
￿￿) ￿￿￿
￿
(14)
The degree of complementarity between intermediate and higher education is an impor-
tant determinant of the changes in relative prices. An increase in the amount of human
capital at intermediate level has both a standard supply e⁄ect (SE) and a complementarity
e⁄ect (CE). The standard SE is clear from the human capitals￿ratio in round brackets in
equation (12) and (13). For a given supply of basic and higher human capital, an increase in
H2 decreases the relative price of intermediate with respect to basic education and increases
the relative price of higher with respect to intermediate education. The CE is given by the
term in curly brackets in equation (12) and (14). The size of the SE and CE e⁄ects depends
on the magnitude of the elasticity parameters, ￿ and ￿. If ￿ > ￿, that is if higher and
intermediate education are more complementary than higher and basic (or intermediate and
tion between either higher or intermediate and basic education (Manacorda, Sanchez-Paramo and Schady
2010).
13basic), an increase in H2 further decreases the relative price of intermediate with respect to
basic education and increases the relative price of higher with respect to basic education.
3.3 Equilibrium steady state
Given an initial distribution of ability, ￿nancial assets and education, and the world interest
rate, an equilibrium steady state is given by a vector of education prices, p = [p1;p2;p3],
aggregate labour inputs, H = [H1;H2;H3], parental decision rules for consumption and
education choices, [ca;Ia], individual labour supply of education j, ja, individual labour
e¢ ciency, ej;a, age and education speci￿c measures, ’j;a for a = a;:::;a, such that:
1. Given the prices [p1;p2;p3], the contingent plans ca and Ia solve the household maxi-
mization problem (3) subject to (4) to (7).
2. Given the prices [p1;p2;p3], ￿rms choose optimally the production factors and prices
are marginal productivities:
pj =
@Y
@Hj
8j
3. Labour markets clear:
Hj =
a=a X
a=a
Z
S
(ja(s) ￿ exp(ej;a;t))d’j;a(s) 8j
where S de￿nes the state vector at age a minus the education states, i.e. S ￿ (Aa;p(a);￿;za).
The steady state is computed by solving the model recursively by standard backwards
induction from the last to the ￿rst period of adult life. All details of the solution algorithm
are available upon request.
3.4 Determining the parameters of the model
The ideal data set to estimate the model would combine micro data on the earnings of
workers, their life-cycle consumption and wealth holdings, and macro data on prices and
aggregates. Using the micro data joined with the aggregate prices, I could estimate the
parameters of the household decision problem and construct human capital aggregates that
14could be used to determine the output technology. Two obstacles prevent implementing this
approach. First, I lack information on consumption linked to labour earnings over many
years. Second, the data on market wages do not reveal education prices, as it is evident from
the distinction between w and p in equation (1), so it is not possible to estimate aggregate
stocks of human capital using wage data directly.
To circumvent the ￿rst limitation, I set the initial distribution of wealth to match the
distribution of wealth in the Mexican Expenditure Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos
y Gastos de los Hogares or ENIGH), and the distribution of education to match the wage
data from the ENEU survey in 1987, and I choose intertemporal substitution parameters
in consumption to be consistent with those reported in the empirical literature. I set the
borrowing limit B to zero, which corresponds to the maximum level of credit constraints,
and I calibrate each ￿xed education cost Fj to match the share of workers aged between 25
and 60 with the jth level of education in the ENEU data for 1987. To circumvent the second
limitation, I follow the standard method developed by Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998)
of using wage data to infer education prices and estimate human capital aggregates, which
can then be used to estimate the parameters of the production function.
For conciseness all details of the calibration and estimation of the model are presented
and discussed in Appendix B. The most important result concerns the production function:
I estimate the elasticity of substitution between workers with higher and with intermediate
education to be lower than the elasticity of substitution between workers with either higher
or intermediate and basic education, which is consistent with production complementarities
between intermediate and higher education.
3.5 Simulations
Having being solved and estimated, I use the model to study the factors that induced the
wage pro￿le to convexify. I do so by comparing the steady state wages by level of education
that the model predicts in a baseline scenario that matches the Mexican economy in 1987
and in di⁄erent counterfactual scenarios characterized by an increased demand for educated
labour.
153.5.1 Exogenous labour supply
The increasing share of workers with intermediate education that between 1987 and 2002
went up from 30% to 45% (see Section 2) is consistent with the decreasing trend in the relative
returns to intermediate education, while the increase share of workers with higher education
from 10% to 17% at a time of an increase in their relative wages is evidence of a demand
increase that more that outweighed the supply increase for this education group. As already
discussed in Section 2, a vast empirical literature has documented an increased demand
for educated labor in the 1990s in Mexico, and all studies agree that in the 1990s Mexico
underwent a structural change towards the use of skilled labor in production. Consistently
with this ￿nding, I also ￿nd that between 1987 and 2002 the share of skilled and higher
educated labour used in production (￿s and ￿3 in equation (9) and (10)) have increased,
respectively, by 1:35% and 2:62% a year (Section B1.2 in Appendix B).
Could the increased demand for educated labour have changed the education prices and
produced the convexi￿cation without the supply of labour playing any major role?
In order to isolate the e⁄ect of the demand￿ s change, I compute a baseline steady state
that matches the linear wage-education pro￿le in 1987 and starting from this baseline I
increase the demand for educated labour while keeping the supply of labour by education
￿xed at the baseline￿ s levels. I compute three di⁄erent steady states that correspond to
the increase in the share of skilled labour that I have estimated from the data: scenario I
that I obtain by increasing ￿s by 1:35% for each year between 1987 and 2002, scenario II
by increasing ￿3 by 2:62% a year, and scenario III by increasing both ￿s and ￿3. Table 2
presents the percentage changes of the equilibrium log wages between 1987 and 2002 in the
ENEU data, and in scenario I, II, and III with respect to the baseline; Table 3 reports the
corresponding percentage changes in relative wages.
In scenario I, II and III labour supply is taken as exogenously given and all changes in
the prices of education are due to the increased demand for educated labour. Equations
(12) and (13) show that an increase in ￿s increases the equilibrium price (and therefore the
equilibrium wage) of intermediate and higher education relative to basic education, while
an increase in ￿3 increases the wage di⁄erential between higher and intermediate education
16and decreases the wage di⁄erential between intermediate and basic education. Consistently,
relative wages to higher and to intermediate education increase in scenario I and III, while
they have a divergent trend in scenario II. Scenario II matches the changes in relative wages
observed in the data, but it is unable to match the decrease in the level of intermediate and
basic wages.
% change log wage level relative to baseline Data I II III
Basic ￿4% 6% 11% 6%
Intermediate ￿5% 20% 9% 10%
Higher 3% 30% 35% 37%
Table 2: Growth of log wages by education in the data and in di⁄erent scenarios with
respect to the baseline. Scenario I: increased demand for skilled labour; scenario II: increased
demand for higher education; scenario III: increased demand for skilled labour and for higher
education. Exogenous labour supply in all scenarios.
% change log wage di⁄erential relative to baseline Data I II III
Higher versus Intermediate 73% 17% 77% 78%
Intermediate versus Basic ￿15% 59% ￿17% 15%
Table 3: Growth of log relative wages in the data and in di⁄erent scenarios with respect to the
baseline. Scenario I: increased demand for skilled labour; scenario II: increased demand for
higher education; scenario III: increased demand for skilled labour and for higher education.
Exogenous labour supply in all scenarios.
3.5.2 Endogenous labour supply
The simulations in the previous section show that for the size of the demand changes esti-
mated from the data an increased demand for educated labour alone could not have produced
the convexi￿cation. The next step is to explore the role of the endogenous supply of labour.
From now on I will model the increased demand for educated labour as in scenario I, that is
as an increased share of skilled labour (￿s), and I will de￿ne a series of counterfactuals that
allow the supply of labour to react to this increased demand.
I de￿ne a fourth counterfactual, scenario IV, which I compute by increasing ￿s by 1:35%
a year and by allowing the supply of labour to react to this demand increase. The second
column of Table 4 and Table 5 reports, respectively, the percentage changes in log wages and
in relative wages in scenario IV with respect to scenario I.
17% change log wage level IV vs I V vs IV IV vs baseline
Basic ￿8% ￿3% ￿1%
Intermediate ￿22% 3% 2%
Higher ￿24% 1% 13%
Table 4: Growth of log wages by education in di⁄erent scenarios. Scenario IV: increased
demand for skilled labour and endogenous labour supply. Scenario V: increased demand for
skilled labour, endogenous labor supply and isoelastic production function.
% change log wage di⁄erential IV vs I V vs IV IV vs baseline
Higher versus Intermediate 17% ￿8% 36%
Intermediate versus Basic ￿26% 27% 17%
Table 5: Growth of log relative wages in di⁄erent scenarios. Scenario IV: increased demand
for skilled labour and endogenous labour supply. Scenario V: increased demand for skilled
labour, endogenous labor supply and isoelastic production function.
The comparison between scenario IV and scenario I shows the role of the endogenous
supply of labour: the higher demand for skilled labour increases the returns to intermediate
and to higher education and gives incentives to invest in education; accordingly, wage levels
decrease. Consistently with the ￿xed costs of education being lower at intermediate than
at higher education (F2 < F3), the supply of workers with intermediate education increases
more than the supply of workers with higher education, and triggers a di⁄erential change
in relative wages, which increased by 17% at higher education, and decreased by 26% at
intermediate education.
The equilibrium e⁄ects of changes in labour supply on wages depends on the degree
of complementarity and substitutability between aggregate human capitals. I estimate the
elasticity of substitution (ES) between workers with higher and with intermediate education
to be 4:4, and the ES between workers with either higher or intermediate and basic education
to be 7:1 (Section B1.2 in Appendix B), which is evidence of complementarities between
workers with intermediate and with higher education.15 I assess the importance of these
complementarities by comparing scenario IV with a ￿fth counterfactual, scenario V, which
assumes an isoelastic production function where ESu;s = ES1;2 = ES1;3 = ES2;3 = 1
1￿￿ =
15The estimated elasticities of substitution are much higher than the typical estimates obtained from US
data (e.g. Katz and Murphy 1992) but are consistent with the estimates obtained by Manacorda, Sanchez-
Paramo and Schady (2010), which, to the best of my knowledge, is the only other paper to have estimated
a CES production function with three levels of education for Latin America.
184:4. The third column of Table 4 and Table 5 reports, respectively, the percentage changes
in log wages and in relative wages in scenario V with respect to scenario IV.
When the production function is isoelastic and only the direct supply e⁄ect operates, in-
termediate wages increase and the sign of the changes in relative wages is reversed - relative
wages to intermediate education increase, and relative wages to higher education decrease.
The comparison between the second and the third column in Table 6 shows that an en-
dogenous labour supply and production complementarities are both important to match the
di⁄erential change in relative wages that characterize the convexi￿cation. However, scenario
IV is still unable to match the data: the supply of workers with intermediate education does
not increase enough to allow intermediate wages to decrease, so that, with respect to the
baseline economy in 1987, intermediate wages increase and both relative returns to higher
and to intermediate education increase (fourth column of Table 4 and Table 5).
An important factor that a⁄ects the supply of education is the ability to borrow to ￿nance
schooling investments. In all the simulations up to now the borrowing limit B is set to zero
so that borrowing is not allowed and the total amount of resources of a given household
can not exceed the sum of parental wealth and total household earnings. In order to assess
the role of borrowing, I de￿ne a sixth counterfactual, scenario VI, which relaxes the credit
constraints to the upper bound that B can take.16 Table 6 presents the growth of log wages
and of relative wages in scenario VI with respect to the baseline.
Log wage level VI vs baseline Log wage di⁄erential VI vs baseline
Basic ￿1%
Intermediate ￿4% Higher-Intermediate 48%
Higher 9% Intermediate-Basic ￿14%
Table 6: Growth of log wages by education and of log relative wages in scenario VI with
respect to the baseline.
In scenario VI wages convexify: relative wages to higher education increased and relative
16The internal consistency of the model allows to set an upper bound for the value that B can take at
any age, which is given by the present discounted value of the lifetime earnings at age a under the lowest
possible realization of the idiosyncratic education-speci￿c shock zj. Given the distribution of zj de￿ned over
a ￿nite support with a minimum value, zj, and a maximum value, zj, zj de￿nes the lowest possible value
that zj can take. I compute ei
j;a =
￿
￿i + gj(agei) + zj
￿
. At each age a, given parental education level j,
Ba =
a￿a P
t=0
w
i
j;a
(1+r)t =
a￿a P
t=0
(pj￿exp(e
i
j;a))
(1+r)t where r is the world interest rate.
19wages to intermediate education decreased, while wages decreased for those with intermediate
and basic education and increased for those with higher education. As expected, the more
it is possible to borrow, the higher the investment in education after compulsory schooling.
Unreported results show that there is a borrowing threshold of around 40% of individuals￿
lifetime earnings below which the size of the supply increase of workers with intermediate
education would not be big enough to match the wage changes observed in the data. The
level of credit constraints appears as the main factor that a⁄ects investment in education.
If the borrowing limit is set to zero and borrowing is not allowed, unreported scenarios
characterized by changes in the extent of earnings￿risk, as well as by changes in additional
factors that a⁄ect educational and saving choices such as the degree of relative risk aversion
and the degree of parental altruism are unable to match the wage changes that are observed
in the data.
4 Discussion
The results of the simulations identify two main factors driving the convexi￿cation. First,
production complementarities that are responsible for the di⁄erential change between rela-
tive wages of higher educated workers, which increased, and relative wages of intermediate
educated workers, which decreased; second, a relaxation of the credit constrains, which al-
lowed the supply of intermediate educated workers to increase, and thus induced mean wages
for these workers to decrease as observed in the data.
In this section I ￿rst assess how much of the wage convexi￿cation is due to changes in the
education prices, and I then discuss production complementarities and credit constraints. I
conclude the section with a brief discussion of two factors that are not included in the model
and could have contributed to the convexi￿cation.
4.1 Changes in education prices
The wage changes predicted by the model in scenario VI match closely the changes observed
in the data: intermediate wages decreased by 5% in the data and by 4% in the model, while
relative wages to higher education increased by 73% in the data and by 48% in the model,
20and relative wages to intermediate education decreased by 15% in the data and by 14% in
the model.
How much of the wage convexi￿cation is due to changes in the prices of education?
Equation (1) allows computing the changes in the prices of education, that is in the
component of the wages that does not depend on age and ability. Table 7 presents the
growth of the education prices and of the relative prices in scenario VI with respect to the
baseline model.
% change scenario VI with respect to baseline
Log price Log price di⁄erential
Basic ￿2%
Intermediate ￿6% Higher-Intermediate 75%
Higher 10% Intermediate-Basic ￿26%
Table 7: Growth of prices by education and of relative prices in scenario VI with respect to
the baseline.
Both the changes in the level of prices and in relative prices are close in magnitude to
the changes in wages reported in Table 6: wages and prices increase at higher education
and decrease at basic and at intermediate education, and for both prices and wages the
higher-intermediate di⁄erential increases and the intermediate-basic di⁄erential decreases.
Interestingly, while the intermediate-basic di⁄erential decreases more in prices than in wages,
the higher-intermediate di⁄erential increases more in prices than in wages, which is consistent
with negative ability sorting at higher education.
The comparison between Table 6 and Table 7 suggests that the role of changes in age
and ability composition is minor: the convexi￿cation was driven by changes in the prices of
education. One problem with this result is that the estimates of the ability distribution are
obtained using quarterly wage data with only four observations for each individual (Section
B1.1 in Appendix B), and thus su⁄er from the incidental parameters￿problem (Heckman
1981).
An alternative way to assess the contribution of changes in ability composition is to
compare the changes in the wage-education pro￿le of the cohorts of workers that made all
their education choices before 1987 with the changes in the wage-education pro￿le of the
cohorts that invested in education during the 1990s. Assuming that investment in education
21ends at age 25 and that individuals enter the labour market by the end of the education
period, the sub-sample of workers aged 41-60 in 2002 consists of individuals that made all
their schooling decisions before 1987. If changes in ability composition were driving the
convexi￿cation, the wage-education pro￿le of those that made all their schooling decisions
before 1987 and were in the labour market by then should not have convexi￿ed.
I estimate a log wage equation that controls for the level of education, age and its in-
teraction with the level of education for the sub-sample of those aged 41-60 in 2002, and I
compute the predicted wage for each level of education. I estimate the same wage regression
for 1987, and I compute the changes in predicted log relative wages between 2002 and 1987.
I ￿nd that the log wages of those aged 41-60 in 2002 did convexify: the higher-intermediate
wage di⁄erential increased and the intermediate-basic wage di⁄erential decreased. These
results are consistent with the ￿ndings of a number of papers that changes in returns to
education in Latin America in the 1990s were not driven by changes in ability composition
(e.g. Binelli, Meghir and Menezes-Filho 2010 for Brazil).
4.2 Production complementarities
The elasticities of substitution that I estimated from the data (Section B1.2 in Appendix B)
are consistent with production complementarities between intermediate and higher educa-
tion. Is there empirical evidence to support this ￿nding? The production complementarities
between workers with intermediate and higher education are consistent with a two-sector
economy in which a ￿rst sector employs low-skilled labour and a second sector employs semi
and high-skilled labour. This structure of production provides a good description of the
Mexican economy that can be characterized as being made by a formal sector of semi and
high-skilled workers and an informal sector of low-skilled workers. By de￿ning a worker as
"formal" if paying social security contributions in either the private or the public sector,
evidence from the ENEU shows that between 1987 and 2002 almost 80% of formal sector
workers have at least completed high school education. The importance of this dual produc-
tion structure is consistent with the ￿ndings of Binelli and Attanasio (2010) that show how
the dynamics of wage inequality in Mexico in the 1990s are strongly correlated with changes
in the size of the formal and informal sectors.
22Production complementarities between middle and high-skilled workers have also been
pointed out as an important determinant of changes in wage di⁄erentials by Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2006). By taking the supply of education as exogenously given, and assuming that
middle-skilled workers are complementary to high-skilled workers and perfect substitutes to
computerization, Autor et al show that a fall in computer prices leads to a polarization of
employment and earnings, and use US data to provide supporting evidence to the qualitative
predictions of their model.
Autor et al￿ s model is an example of the "task-based technical change" (TBTC) models
that introduced the task dimension into the production function (Autor, Levy and Murnane
2003). The key feature of the TBTC models is the assumption that labour production factors
(typically three) di⁄er with respect to the task content of their occupations, and that there
are substitutabilities between tasks performed by workers with di⁄erent skills.
TBTC models have been extensively used to explain the polarization of employment and
wages (e.g. Autor and Dorn 2010 for the US; Goos, Manning and Solomons 2010 for Europe),
and to quantify the contribution of changes in occupations to changes in the distribution of
wages (e.g. Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux 2009 for the US). Even if for Mexico there are no
publicly available data with information on the task intensity of occupations, Medina and
Posso (2010) apply a TBTC-type model to Mexico by assuming that low skilled workers
perform manual intensive tasks, middle skilled workers perform routine intensive tasks, and
highly skilled workers perform abstract tasks. Under this assumed tasks￿distribution, they
￿nd some evidence of employment and wage polarization in the decade of the 1990s. If
tasks data for Mexico were to become available and found to con￿rm the tasks￿distribution
assumed by Medina and Posso, their results would suggest that the production complemen-
tarities between intermediate and higher educated workers that I have estimated could be
driven by complementarities between tasks performed by these two types of educated labour.
4.3 Relaxation of credit constraints
Together with production complementaries, a central role to explain the convexi￿cation is
played by the relaxation of the credit constraints, which allowed the supply of workers with
intermediate education to increase. While there are no available Mexican data to show
23directly that increases in credit availability have led to increases in education enrollments,
there are two important pieces of evidence that provide indirect support for this ￿nding.
First, there is evidence that in the 1990s education enrollment rates increased while ￿nancial
support via education subsidies and scholarships remained almost non-existent and the costs
of education were very high; second, there is evidence that the availability of credit to
Mexican households increased.
Binelli and Rubio-Codina (2013) show that the increase in the supply of workers with
intermediate education in the decade of the 1980s and 1990s in Mexico was driven by higher
enrollment rates rather than by lower drop-out rates. They also show that intermediate
education in Mexico is expensive. Binelli and Rubio-Codina (2013) ￿nd that the costs of
attending a public high school amount to around 15% of median yearly household income,
and the costs of attending a private high school amount to around 23%. At higher edu-
cation average costs are at around 25% of per-capita income per student per year, which
compare to an average of less than 20% for high income countries (Bloom and Murakami
2008). At the same time, in Mexico there is very little to no support in the form of students￿
loans and scholarships neither at the intermediate (Binelli and Rubio-Codina 2013) nor at
higher education (Bloom and Murakami 2008). Consistently with the high costs of educa-
tion and the lack of ￿nancial support, there is evidence that credit constraints matter for
schooling decisions. Jacoby and Skou￿as (2002) ￿nd that parental income is an important
determinant of college attendance. Kaufmann (2014) shows that poor individuals with high
expected returns are particularly responsive to changes in direct costs of college and that a
sizeable fraction of poor individuals would attend college if direct costs of college attendance
decreased.
Higher enrollment rates in the face of high costs of education and lack of ￿nancial support
are consistent with households having increased resources to ￿nance education. There is
evidence that access to credit in Mexico increased in the decade of the 1990s. The ENIGH
survey can be used to relate the change in the level of credit constraints to measurable changes
in the credit market. The ENIGH has a similar structure to the Family Expenditure Survey
in the UK and is available for 1984, 1989, 1992 and every two years since then. Since 1992
the ENIGH survey contains detailed information on a number of variables that can be used
24to compute measures of ￿nancial income and wealth assets (Binelli and Attanasio 2010). I
use the ratio of credit cards debts and consumer loans to household labour income as a proxy
for the amount of borrowing over household income, and I ￿nd that this proxy increased by
around 30% between 1992 and 2002.17
In addition to the micro-evidence provided by the ENIGH, there is also macro-evidence
that in the 1990s in Mexico borrowing constraints became less stringent. Evidence from the
Bank of Mexico shows that in 2002 the amount of credit to consumers was almost double
the size of the amount in 1994 due to a process of ￿nancial liberalization and deregulation
of the securities markets, which resulted into an increased availability of consumer credit.
The most recent available data from the Bank of Mexico show that the increase in consumer
credit still continues: at the end of 2008 the total amount of credit to consumers was almost
three times the size of the amount granted in 2002.18
4.4 Labour market institutions and international migration
The model abstracts from labour market institutions such as unions and minimum wages,
and international migration, which could be two potentially important determinants of the
wage convexi￿cation. Minimum wages could have played a particularly important role by
preventing the wages of workers with basic education to fall below a certain threshold thus
contributing to the decrease in relative wages of intermediate educated workers. However,
in the 1990s in Mexico the degree of unionization markedly declined (Raymundo, Esquivel,
and Lustig 2012), and minimum wages decreased by around 50% relative to median earnings
(Bosch and Manacorda 2010). Therefore, in the period of analysis unions lost power and
minimum wages did not act as an anchor for low skilled wages by preventing wages of workers
with basic education to fall.
A second potentially important factor that is not included in the model and could have
a⁄ected wages by education in the decade of the 1990s is international migration. In par-
17The ENIGH evidence is as follows: in 1992 the median amount of credit cards debts and consumer loans
and median household labour income were, respectively, at around 551 and 8346 Mexican Pesos; in 2002
these amounts increased to, respectively, around 2073 and 5698 Mexican Pesos. Thus, the median ratio of
credit cards debts and consumer loans over household labour income increased from around 6% to 36%.
18http://www.banxico.org.mx/estadisticas/statistics.html
25ticular, in the 1990s there were vast migration ￿ ows from Mexico to the US, which could
have resulted in changes in the level of wages by education and thus to the convexi￿cation.
However, these migration ￿ ows were mainly out￿ ows of low-skilled workers with two thirds
of the adult Mexican immigrants to the US having not completed intermediate education.19
This low-skilled migration could have contributed to the sustained low value of the wages of
workers with basic education, but there is no evidence that it did contribute to the decline
of the wages of workers with intermediate education, which drove the convexi￿cation.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies a central feature that characterizes the changes in wage inequality in the
decade of the 1990s: the wage-education pro￿le convexi￿ed. The wage di⁄erential between
higher and intermediate education increased and the wage di⁄erential between intermediate
and basic education declined. These wage changes have important implications for the
process of human capital accumulation. The non-linearity of the wage pro￿le changes the
opportunity costs of investing in education, which becomes pro￿table only if college education
is completed, and may induce the poor to drop out of school or even not to invest in human
capital at all if they cannot a⁄ord ￿nancing education until the end of college.
In several low and middle-income countries the convexi￿cation was particularly pro-
nounced and came together with signi￿cant changes in the demand and in the supply of
educated labour. Using data from Mexico I show that the simultaneous changes in the de-
mand and in the supply of labour were a fundamental determinant of the convexi￿cation: an
initial increase in the demand for educated workers induced a supply reaction with non-linear
e⁄ects on wages due to complementarities in production between workers with intermediate
and with higher education. The supply reaction happened because of increased availabil-
ity of borrowing that relaxed credit constraints. The ￿nding that easier access to credit
has led to an erosion of the returns to intermediate education provides further evidence of
the "paradox of progress" that a more equal stock of education could increase inequality
if returns to schooling are convex (Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig 2005 and Gasparini,
19www.cis.org
26Galiani, Guillermo and Acosta 2011). E⁄ective policy interventions to promote educational
investments should account and compensate for the non-linear costs of schooling at di⁄erent
levels of education.
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33Appendix A - The ENEU and the Mexican education system
A1 The Mexican employment survey (ENEU)
The ENEU (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano) is the Mexican employment survey
collected yearly by the Mexican national statistical o¢ ce, INEGI. It is available yearly from
1987 to 2004 and it covers only urban areas with municipalities being the primary sampling
units. The sampling scheme has changed over time with a number of smaller municipalities
having progressively entered the sample. The ENEU is a quarterly household survey with
a rotating panel structure similar to the US Current Population Survey: households are
interviewed for ￿ve consecutive quarters and in each quarter 20% of the households are re-
placed by new households that are interviewed for the ￿rst time. The survey reports detailed
employment information on individuals at least twelve years old with several questions on
occupation status, type and characteristics of employment, sector of main and secondary
job, contract type, working hours, monthly earnings, unemployment status and duration,
and social security taxes paid by the worker￿ s employer in the private and public sector.
Importantly for the analysis in this paper, the ENEU accurately reports earnings for each
individual in each of four consecutive quarters. For those paid by the week the survey
transforms weekly earnings into monthly earnings by multiplying the former by 4.3. Similar
adjustments are used for workers paid by the day or every two weeks. Hourly wages are
computed as the ratio between monthly earnings and hours worked in the main occupation.
The de￿nition of earnings in the survey refers to monthly earnings received from the main
job net of all labour taxes and social security contributions paid in either public or private
funds. The use of after-tax earnings to study the convexi￿cation could be problematic in the
presence of changes in the tax system that induced an increase in after-tax wages more at
the top than at the bottom of the distribution. Indeed, data show that between 1987 and
2002 top marginal tax rates in Mexico decreased from 55% to 35%.20 However, overall, the
tax changes that were implemented in Mexico as well as in most Latin American countries in
the 1990s were characterized by a general decrease in net tax rate, due to very high personal
exemptions and deductions, and very low taxes on capital gains and incomes from ￿nancial
20http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/
34sources, so that the progressivity of personal income taxes did barely a⁄ect the progressivity
of the tax system (Tanzi 2000), with no evidence of substantial distributional e⁄ects to the
top of the income distribution.
A2 The Mexican education system and the construction of the
education groups
The Mexican education system consists of four main cycles: pre-school, primary, sec-
ondary, and post-secondary education. Pre-school education is between age 3 and 6 and is
provided free of charge. Primary education starts at age 6, lasts 6 years and has always been
compulsory. Secondary education comprises two main levels: lower and upper secondary.
Lower secondary lasts between 3 to 4 years, depending on the program. Upper secondary
lasts 3 years. Both levels of secondary education includes an "academic" and a "vocational"
branch that paves the way, respectively, to university and non-university education. In
1993 lower secondary education became compulsory. This policy change mainly a⁄ected
rural areas with a large increase in the construction of schools and corresponding increas-
ing attainment rates at lower secondary education in these areas. Post-secondary education
comprises universities, 2 and 4-years technical institutes, and graduate education. By far the
majority of undergraduate students are enrolled in universities and a very small proportion is
enrolled in 2-years technical institutes. University takes 4 to 5 years and graduate education
lasts between 2 to 4 years.
I have aggregated the schooling levels as follows: the "basic education" group includes
those with up to uncompleted upper secondary education, the "intermediate education"
group includes those with up to uncompleted university education, and the "higher educa-
tion" group includes those with completed university education or more. In the decade of
the 1990s average attainment rates were above 90% at primary education nationwide; at
lower secondary they were above 80% in urban areas and below 40% in rural areas. Since
the ENEU only covers urban areas I group primary and lower secondary education into
"compulsory basic education". Finally, following Manacorda, Sanchez-Paramo and Schady
(2010), I combine the academic and vocational branch of secondary education by considering
in the "intermediate education" group all that have completed any of the two branches.
35Appendix B - Estimation and calibration
B1 Estimation
1. Wage equations
In order to estimate equation (1), I exploit the ENEU quarterly panel structure by
specifying the following log wage equation for individual i with education level j in quarter
qr:
lnw
i
j;qr = lnwj;qr + gj(age
i
qr) + u
i
j;qr j = 1;2;3 (15)
u
i
j;qr = ￿
i + z
i
j;qr (16)
zj;qr ￿ N(0;￿
2
zj;qr) (17)
where lnwi
j;qr is the log hourly real wage of individual i with education level j in quarter
qr, lnwj;qr is the average log wage among those with education level j in quarter qr, gj(:) is
an education-speci￿c quadratic polynomial in age that proxies for experience in the labour
market, ￿i is a permanent individual-speci￿c e⁄ect, and z is an i.i.d. shock.
The estimates of equation (15) are used to parameterize the wages of the working popu-
lation in the baseline model, that is the wages of both adult (parents) and young (children)
workers in 1987. Therefore, I consider all workers aged between 15 (minimum legal work-
ing age) and 60 (average retirement age) in the ENEU survey for 1987, and I exploit the
quarterly rotating panel structure of the ENEU by constructing panels of individuals by
matching workers by the position in an identi￿ed household, number of years of education
and age. I then run the following ￿xed e⁄ects regression:
(lnw
i
j;qr ￿ lnw
i
j) = (lnwj;qr ￿ lnwj) + gj(age
i
qr) ￿ gj(agei) + (u
i
j;qr ￿ u
i
j) (18)
where the upper-bar variables denote time averages over the four quarters in a given
year. lnwi
j is the average log wage over the four quarters for the ith individual with the jth
education level, lnwj is the mean log wage over the four quarters for education level j. The
term (lnwj;qr ￿ lnwj) is modelled as quarter-education dummies￿interactions. gj(agei
qr) is
an education-speci￿c quadratic polynomial in age.
36The estimation of equation (18) allows to measure b ￿i, the unconditional distribution of
ability of the working population, as follows:
b ￿i =
N(i) P
n=1
lnwi
qr ￿ \ lnwqr ￿ \ g(agei
qr)
N(i)
(19)
where N(i) is the total number of observations available on individual i. I ￿nd that the
distribution of b ￿i has a variance of 0:25 and a zero mean, which I use to parameterize the
ability distribution in the model.
By having estimated equation (18), I can treat as observable the following:
z
i
j;qr = lnw
i
j;qr ￿ gj(age
i
qr) ￿ lnwj;qr ￿ ￿
i (20)
where zj;qr is normally distributed with mean zero and variance ￿2
zj. I ￿nd that b ￿
2
z1 =
0:25, b ￿
2
z2 = 0:26, and b ￿
2
z3 = 0:29, which I use to parameterize the distribution of z in the
model.
I obtain an estimate of the age e⁄ects by running equation (18) for each year between
1987 and 2002 and by taking the average of the yearly rescaled estimates of the age and age
squared term by education. For the linear term in age, I estimate 0:157, 0:197 and 0:256,
respectively, for basic, intermediate, and higher education; the corresponding estimates for
the quadratic term in age are: ￿0:018, ￿0:015, and ￿0:022. These estimates are consistent
with standard estimates of concave returns to experience increasing by level of education.21
2. Production function
The method used to approximate the aggregate human capital series follows Heckman,
Lochner and Taber (1998) by obtaining the estimated value of human capital j at time t,
b Hj;t, as the ratio of the total wage bill for education level j in year t, and an estimate of the
price for that level of education in that year, b pj;t.
I obtain an estimate of the log prices by level of education and year by running the
21Since each model￿ s period is equal to 7 years, the age e⁄ects can equivalently be estimated by constructing
seven years age cohorts and using the pooled 1987-2002 dataset to estimate a cohort wage regression where
wages for individual i in year t depend on a constant term, education level interacted with cohort and cohort
squared, and education-year interaction terms.
37￿xed e⁄ect regression speci￿ed in equation (18) for each year between 1987 and 2002 and by
computing the predicted mean log hourly real wage by level of education net of the individual
￿xed e⁄ects ￿i. In order to compute the wage bills I use the Mexican Expenditure Survey,
the ENIGH, that is nationally-representative and reports individual earnings together with
detailed information on assets and consumption. The ENIGH is available in 1984, 1987 and
every two years since then.
For each year between 1987 and 2002 and education group I compute the wage bill by
summing over the individual earnings of all primary wage earners aged between 15 and 60.
I linearly interpolate the available data for the missing years. Given the wage bills and the
(log) education prices, I can divide the wage bills by the exponentiated value of the log
price of education to obtain the time series of the human capital aggregates for each year
and education group. The identi￿cation of the H factors is then consistent with the ability
distribution estimated from the data and used to simulate the model. Log linearizing the
relative price of higher and intermediate education,
p3;t
p2;t =
￿3;t
(1￿￿3;t)
￿
H3;t
H2;t
￿￿￿1
, and rewriting it
in terms of wage bills, I obtain:
(logWB3;t ￿ logWB2;t) = [log￿3;t ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿3;t)] + ￿(log b H3;t ￿ log b H2;t) (21)
where b H3;t and b H2;t denote the estimated higher and intermediate human capital aggre-
gate at time t. The time-varying factor shares ￿2;t and ￿3;t re￿ ect changes in the productivity
of and in the demand for workers with intermediate and higher education. I express the log
of the share parameters as the sum of a constant and a time-varying component:
log￿j;t = ￿0;j + ￿1;j ￿ t + ej;t (22)
where ￿0;j is an education-speci￿c constant, t denotes a linear time trend and ej;t is a
normally distributed i.i.d. shock at time t for education level j.
Combining equation (21) and (22), I estimate the value of the parameter determining the
elasticity of substitution between higher and intermediate education, ￿, from a regression of
the ratio of the log wage bills on the ratio of the human capital aggregates, a linear trend
and a constant. Then, I construct a measure of skilled human capital as a weighted sum
38of workers with intermediate and higher education. To do so, I need an estimate of the log
factor shares ￿3;t. Given equation (21) and (22) and the fact that ￿2;t = (1 ￿ ￿3;t), I have
that log
h
￿3;t
(1￿￿3;t)
i
= (￿0 +￿1 ￿t); where ￿0 = (￿0;3 ￿￿0;2) and ￿1 = (￿1;3 ￿￿1;2). Therefore,
￿3;t =
exp(￿0+￿1￿t)
(1+exp(￿0+￿1￿t)): Finally, I can estimate a regression of the ratio of the log wage bills for
skilled and unskilled on the ratio of skilled and unskilled human capital, a linear trend and a
constant to obtain an estimate of ￿. Using the wage bill equations for skilled and unskilled,
the equivalent of equation (22) for log￿s;t and the de￿nition of the unskilled labor share as
one minus the skilled share, I can identify ￿s;t following the same steps used to identify ￿3;t.
For the year 1987, I obtain a baseline estimate of 0:55 for ￿3 and of 0:69 for ￿s.
Equation (21) su⁄ers from endogeneity: changes in the relative supply of education react
to the changes in relative demand that this equation is set to identify. I instrument (log b H3;t￿
log b H2;t) with the lagged values of (log b H3;t ￿ log b H2;t) and with the size of the cohorts of
workers with compulsory basic education measured as the proportion of those with primary
education in a given year. The ￿rst instrument is a standard instrumental variable often
used in macroeconomics to estimate production functions (e.g. Heckman, Lochner and Taber,
1998; Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante 2008). The assumption is that lagged relative supply
impacts on relative wages only via current relative supply, the validity of which increases
with longer time series. With sixteen years of data (1987-2002) I can experiment with the use
of di⁄erent sets of lags. The second instrument is motivated by the very nature of the model:
primary education is compulsory so it is not a margin of choice. At the same time, it impacts
on educational investments at both intermediate and at higher education by determining the
level of the price of basic education and therefore the relative returns to intermediate as well
as to higher education.
Table 9 reports the estimates of the elasticity of substitution between higher and inter-
mediate education: the ￿rst, second and third column report, respectively, the second-stage
and the ￿rst-stage results when using as instrumental variable the ￿rst lag of the log human
capital di⁄erence (IVa), the size of the cohorts of workers with primary education (IVb),
and both of them (IVc, where the ￿rst row of the ￿rst-stage results reports the estimates
obtained when I use as instrument the ￿rst lag of the log human capital di⁄erence, and the
second row reports the estimates obtained when I use as instrument the size of the cohorts
39of workers with primary education). Table 10 reports the estimates of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between skilled and unskilled: the second-stage results, and the ￿rst-stage results
when using as instrument the ￿rst lag of the log human capital di⁄erence.22 All instruments
in the ￿rst stage have a strong signi￿cant impact on the endogenous variable and in the
expected direction.
Higher versus Intermediate
Parameter IVa IVb IVc
Di⁄erence log H 0:7726 0:7331 0:7239
(0:0636) (0:0556) (0:0583)
Time trend 0:0262 0:0279 0:0287
(0:0048) (0:0041) (0:0049)
Constant ￿51:9469 ￿55:2268 ￿56:8015
(9:5317) (8:2465) (9:7303)
Implied ES 4:4 3:7 3:6
First Stage
Instruments￿set 0:5796 ￿6:4816 0:2184
(0:1822) (1:5061) (0:1753)
￿6:2105
(2:3588)
Table 8: Estimation of the production function: IV regression of the ratio of log wage bills
for higher and intermediate on the ratio of human capitals, a linear trend and a constant.
IVa: instrument is ￿rst lagged di⁄erence of higher and intermediate human capital. IVb:
instrument is the size of the primary educated cohort. IVc: instruments are both ￿rst lagged
di⁄erence of higher and intermediate human capital and size of the primary educated cohort.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
There are two sets of important parameters￿estimates in Tables 9 and 10: the time
trends and the implied elasticity of substitution (ES). The time trends￿estimates mean that
between 1987 and 2002 the demand for higher educated and for skilled workers increased,
respectively, by around 2:7% and 1:35% a year. The ES between workers with higher and
with intermediate education ( 1
1￿b ￿) is lower than the ES between workers with either higher
(or intermediate) and with basic education, which is consistent with the presence of comple-
mentarities in production between workers with intermediate and with higher education.
I assess the robustness of the estimation results by running two speci￿cation tests. First, I
22The size of the primary educated cohorts is not valid in this case since it is a linear function of the
denominator of the endogenous variable to be instrumented.
40Parameter Skilled versus Unskilled
Di⁄erence log H 0:8601
(0:1362)
Time trend 0:0135
(0:0065)
Constant ￿26:0616
(13:0620)
Implied ES 7:1
First Stage
Lagged di⁄erence log H 0:8327
(0:1512)
Table 9: Estimation of the production function: IV regression of the ratio of log wage bills
for skilled and unskilled on the ratio of human capitals, a linear trend and a constant.
Instrument is ￿rst lagged di⁄erence of skilled and unskilled human capital. Standard errors
in parenthesis. "Unskilled" are workers with basic education. "Skilled" is the sum of workers
with intermediate and with higher education.
run a joint estimation of the system of equations used to estimate the elasticity of substitution
of higher versus intermediate and of skilled versus unskilled, that is the system of equations
made by the IV regression of equation (21) and the IV regression of the equivalent equation
for skilled and unskilled, in order to test for the equality of the coe¢ cients of the log relative
supply of higher and intermediate and skilled and unskilled labour: the test gives a value
of chi-squared of 7:1 with a P-value of 0:0077 con￿rming that ￿ and ￿ are statistically
signi￿cantly di⁄erent. Second, a test for the assumption of equality between ES3;1 and
ES2;1, which is a restriction imposed by the symmetry of the CES operator: the test returns
a value of chi-squared of 0:35 with a P-value of 0:5525, therefore failing to reject the null
hypothesis of equal coe¢ cients.
B2 Calibration
1. Initial distribution of wealth and education, costs of schooling, and
preferences
The ENIGH survey provides individual data on wealth and consumption. I set the initial
wealth distribution to a lognormal distribution with mean and standard deviation computed
from the distribution of ￿nancial assets of the workers aged between 25 and 60 in the ENIGH
41survey for 1992. I ￿nd the mean and standard deviation to be, respectively, 0:25 and 0:71.23
I set the initial distribution of education of the adult and the young population to match
the education distributions observed in the 1987 ENEU data. Consistently with the OLG
model￿ s assumptions, I de￿ne the "adult workers￿population" in the ENEU as the one
made by all working heads of households aged between 25 and 60 with basic, intermediate
and higher education, and the "young workers￿population" as the one made by all workers
living with their parents, aged between 15 and 24, and that have completed basic and
intermediate education. I compute the education distribution of the adult workers as the
relative proportions of adult workers with basic, intermediate and higher education in 1987,
and the education distribution of the young workers as the relative proportion of those with
basic and intermediate education among the young.
The ￿xed costs of schooling by level of education are set to match the education distri-
bution of the adult in the ENEU 1987. I ￿nd that F1 = 0:035, F2 = 0:26 and F3 = 0:64,
which implies that the costs of intermediate education are around seven times the costs of
basic education and the costs of higher education are around eighteen times the costs of
basic education. The Fj ￿xed costs in the model measure the average total direct costs
of education, which include fees, costs of school material and maintenance. An empirical
counterpart of these costs is provided by the ￿rst wave of the Mexican Family Life Survey
(MxFLS), which collects high quality data on a rich set of variables for a cross section of
Mexican households in 2002. The MxFLS contains a detailed set of questions on education
costs and distinguishes between tuition fees, costs of exams, books, school material, uniforms
and maintenance costs for public and private schools. Summing over all these di⁄erent costs￿
categories and averaging the costs over public and private education, I ￿nd that the costs
of intermediate education are around eight times the ones at primary while the costs at
higher education are around nineteen times the ones at primary, which is remarkably close
to the relative magnitudes obtained from the model￿ s calibration. The model abstracts from
non-pecuniary or indirect costs of education. Despite being informative for policy inference
(e.g. Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998), the distinction between direct and indirect costs
23I parameterize the wealth distribution using the moments of the 1992 ENIGH survey since the ENIGH
reached its ￿nal structure only in 1992 with signi￿cant changes in the questionnaire and data collection in
the years before.
42of schooling is not key to the arguments developed in this paper.
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿, is set to 0.9 that gives a value of around 1.1 for
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), which falls within the estimated value of
the EIS provided by Arrau and van Wijnbergen (1991) for Mexico. Consumption is adjusted
to account for the presence of the child. I use an equivalence scale of 0.7 for a child, which
re￿ ects the average calories intake of a child relative to an adult as reported by the Mexican
National Nutritional Institute (HernÆndez, ChÆvez and Bourges, 1987). Assuming that
parent-child dynasties are linked by fully altruistic preferences, I set the altruism parameter,
￿, to one. I set the limit on net indebtedness, B, to zero, which corresponds to the maximum
level of credit constraints.
2. Interest rate and capital share
Mexico can be characterized as a small economy open to ￿nancial trade, particularly with
the US. Consistently, I set the value of the real interest rate, r, to a 5% US benchmark value,
which is the average real interest rate on the US 6-months Treasury Bills published by the
Federal Reserve Board for the period between 1990 and 2000. Given an average working life
of the adult Mexican population of approximately thirty years, the model period is set to 7
years. Therefore, the interest rate in the model is r = (1:057 ￿1) ￿ = 0:41. Setting the yearly
discount factor equal to the inverse of (1 + r), ￿ = 1:05￿7 ￿ = 0:71. The capital share, ￿, is
set to 0:35, which is the average value between the lower and the upper bound estimate for
Latin American countries (Bosworth 1998 for a discussion of the empirical issues involved
in the estimation of the capital share in Mexico, and Harrison 1996, and Ho⁄man 1993 for
two cross-countries empirical studies that use a capital share that varies between the value
of 0:3 and 0:4 for a group of Latin American countries).
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